Sintesi traduzione
La fine della presa di potere di Benjamin Netanyahu in Israele ha alimentato le speculazioni dei media su cosa ciò comporterà per il coordinamento russo-israeliano in Siria. Fonti dei media israeliani, libanesi, sauditi e russi hanno già iniziato a discutere la prospettiva di una crisi imminente tra i due paesi. I ricordi del 20018 non sono sbiaditi, quando un aereo da ricognizione russo II-20 è stato colpito dalle difese aeree siriane durante gli attacchi aerei israeliani, provocando uno scandalo tra Mosca e Israele.
Ad alimentare ulteriormente la narrativa di Mosca che modifica la sua posizione nei confronti di Israele sono i media libanesi filo-siriani e il sito web Russian Spring, è affiliato con il ministero della Difesa russo. Entrambi affermano che Russia e Siria hanno condotto esercitazioni militari per proteggersi dagli attacchi aerei israeliani e che la Siria avrebbe presto ricevuto ulteriori sistemi di difesa aerea da Mosca. Asharq al-Awsat ha affermato che il Cremlino sta cercando di chiudere lo spazio aereo siriano .
Tutto ciò sembra indicare che il Cremlino stia per rivedere il suo approccio con Israele . Un tale cambiamento aiuterebbe sicuramente la Russia a mitigare la sfida che l'IDF pone alla propaganda di Mosca di garantire la sicurezza in Siria e favorirebbe il suo rapporto con l'Iran.Tuttavia, devono essere presi in considerazione diversi fattori relativi alle interazioni Russia-Israele in Siria.
Gli alleati di Netanyahu trovano due ragioni che spiegano la crescente discordia tra Israele e Russia riguardo alla Siria: la mancanza di esperienza nel nuovo governo, che non ha fatto abbastanza per costruire un'efficace strategia di comunicazione con la Russia e l'attenuarsi dei sentimenti pro-israeliani dell'attuale amministrazione.
Ma queste spiegazioni colpiscono nel segno? C'è qualche dubbio. Il tema delle attività israeliane in Siria è stato un argomento regolare e spinoso nei negoziati tra Vladimir Putin e Benjamin Netanyahu anche dopo che la crisi del 2018 era stata risolta. Sono sorti nuovi focolai di discussione. Prendiamo, ad esempio, la visita di Netanyahu a Mosca nel 2019. Il Cremlino non ha nascosto il suo malcontento per i bombardamenti dell'IDF in Siria . La controversia ha acquisito ancora maggiore importanza con la campagna di Mosca di coinvolgere investitori russi e vettori stranieri nella costruzione di un nuovo terminal nell'aeroporto di Damasco. L'atterraggio di Putin all'aeroporto durante la sua visita di Natale in Siria – contrariamente al suo uso abituale della base aerea di Khmeimim – è stata una dimostrazione di sostegno a quella campagna.Mosca ha permesso in molte occasioni ai voli dall'Iran di utilizzare la base aerea di Khmeimim e la presunta minaccia israeliana non ha impedito agli equipaggi iraniani di scaricare il loro carico militare.
Inoltre la reale efficacia dei sistemi di difesa aerea russi schierati in Siria è relativamente bassa. La creazione di difese aeree complesse richiede un grande volume di consegne di armi, che non soddisfa gli interessi della Russia da un punto di vista economico. Rimane un mistero come Damasco sia riuscita a pagare le consegne dei sistemi Pantsir-S1 .
Le spedizioni di sistemi aerei aggiuntivi possono in una certa misura ostacolare le attività di Israele in Siria, ma Damasco deve ancora affrontare una serie di problemi fondamentali, ha detto ad Al-Monitor il blogger di sicurezza russo Yuri Lyamin. "Per colpire obiettivi in profondità nel territorio siriano, Israele utilizza lo spazio aereo libanese o usa lo spazio aereo della Giordania e della Siria orientale che rimane sotto il controllo degli Stati Uniti. Inoltre le capacità dell'IDF consentono tattiche di attacco che sopraffanno le difese aeree siriane”
Mosca sembra trovarsi di fronte al problema generale di mettere insieme un'efficace strategia di comunicazione nei confronti del nuovo governo israeliano. Da un lato, il Cremlino è stato lusingato dall'elogio di Netanyahu per la qualità dei suoi rapporti con il presidente russo. Tuttavia Mosca sta ora lottando per rafforzare le basi istituzionali del rapporto bilaterale con Israele e poter dimostrare che si basa su qualcosa di più del rapporto personale tra Putin e Netanyahu. D'altra parte gli sforzi di Mosca per condurre una diplomazia su fronti differenti, l'hanno messa in più occasioni in una situazione difficile. Si può ricordare l'ambasciatore russo Anatoly Viktorov lamentarsi delle politiche destabilizzanti di Israele in Medio Oriente che supperano quelle iraniane . Quelle dichiarazioni sono arrivate poco dopo quelle di Putin all'inaugurazione del monumento Memorial Candle a Gerusalemme, dove ha parlato contro la revisione della storia della seconda guerra mondiale.
Un altro elemento di tensione riguarda le relazioni israeliane con l'Ucraina che hanno preso forma durante il regno di Netanyahu. Il presidente Vladimir Zelensky è stato anche tra i primi leader mondiali che Naftali Bennett ha chiamato, dopo essere diventato capo del governo israeliano.
Detto questo, non si dovrebbe ignorare il ruolo della politica israeliana. Israele ha bisogno di adottare misure preventive per limitare possibili minacce. Questa è la ragione per cui l'esercito israeliano continua a condurre attacchi aerei in territorio siriano
The end of Benjamin Netanyahu’s grip on power in Israel fueled media speculation of what it means for Russian-Israeli coordination in Syria. Sources in Israeli, Lebanese, Saudi and Russian media outlets already began discussing the prospect of an impending crisis between the two countries. The memories have not faded from autumn 2018, when a Russian II-20 reconnaissance plane was hit by Syrian air defenses during the Israeli airstrikes, causing a scandal between Moscow and Israel.
Al-Monitor columnist Ben Caspit has noted Israel’s unease with the possibility of Russia changing its position on Syria. Publicly, the comments indicating a change are largely limited to Russian Defense Ministry’s claims about its supposed success in repelling Israeli missiles with the aid of the Russian/Soviet-made air defense systems. Caspit’s sources among Israeli security officials said that Russia’s bullish rhetoric is little more than a tactical ruse, yet both the target of this rhetoric and its strategic purpose remain unclear. Moreover, Russia’s claims are contradicted by images of targets hit by Israeli missiles in Damascus and Aleppo.
Further fueling the narrative of Moscow altering its stance vis-à-vis Israel are pro-Syrian Lebanese media outlets and the Russian Spring website, which is affiliated with Russian Defense Ministry. Both claim that Russia and Syria conducted military exercises to protect against Israeli airstrikes and that Syria would soon receive additional air defense systems delivered from Moscow. Asharq al-Awsat claimed that the Kremlin is looking into closing down Syrian airspace from Israeli airstrikes.
All this seems to indicate that the Kremlin is about to revise its approach to Israel in order to force the Israel Defense Forces into accepting new rules of the regional game. Such a shift would certainly help Russia to mitigate the challenge that IDF poses to Moscow’s propaganda by testing the strength of the Kremlin's security guarantees to Syria, as well as challenging the superpower image of the Russian military projects. Revising the rules of the game vis-à-vis Israel’s operations in Syria would also help Moscow cover for Iran, Russia’s ally that is conducting talks on a potential return to the original parameters of its 2015 nuclear deal.
However, several factors pertaining to Russia-Israeli interactions in Syria must be accounted for.
First of all, Russia has been trying to restrain the IDF’s activities since 2017. The initial purpose of this effort — including the Russian press claiming that a Russian air defense system had shot down an Israeli missile — was to create the appearance of Syrian government regaining sovereignty over the country.
Netanyahu’s allies find two reasons that explain the growing discord between Israel and Russia regarding Syria. The first is a lack of experience in the new government, which has not done enough to build an effective communication strategy with the Russians, and secondly, with the US administration toning down its pro-Israeli sentiments.
But do those explanations hit the mark? There is some doubt. The subject of Israeli’s activities in Syria was a regular and thorny topic in negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu even after the 2018 crisis had been resolved. New hotspots of argument sprang up. Take, for example, Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow in 2019. Then, the Kremlin did not hide its disgruntlement over the IDF’s bombings in Syria. The dispute gained even greater importance with Moscow’s campaign to involve Russian investors and foreign carriers in building a new terminal in the Damascus Airport. Putin’s landing at the airport on his Christmas visit to Syria — contrary to his habitual use of the Khmeimim Air Base — was a show of support for that campaign.
Nor there is much novelty in the Russian Defense Ministry’s claims about Israel. In 2020 the ministry put out a rather extravagant statement about a supposed Turkey-Israeli masterplan, whereby Ankara deployed its military convoy to Idlib under the cover of IDF air attacks. In reality, however, those actions did not occur simultaneously.
The ministry also claimed that airstrikes by the F-16 aircraft threatened the security of a plane belonging to the Syrian company Cham Wings from Iran with 172 passengers on board, so that the plane had to perform an emergency landing in Khmeimim. Cham Wings has previously been used to transport Iranian VIPs and militia members. And yet, following that incident, Moscow did on many occasions allow flights from Iran to use the Khmeimim airbase and the supposed Israeli threat did not impede the Iranian crews from unloading their military cargo.
Secondly, the real effectiveness of the Russian air defense systems deployed to Syria is relatively low, mostly due to their haphazard organization. Creating complex, deep air defenses requires a large volume of arms deliveries, which does not suit Russia’s interests from an economic standpoint. Indeed, it remains a mystery how Damascus managed to pay for the deliveries of the Pantsir-S1 systems that the country already has.
Shipments of additional air systems may to some extent impede Israel’s activities in Syria, but Damascus is still faced with a number of fundamental problems, Russian security blogger Yuri Lyamin told Al-Monitor. “To strike targets deep into Syria’s territory, Israel utilizes Lebanese airspace or uses Jordan and eastern Syrian airspace that, for all the practical purposes, remains under the US control,” he said. “As a result, Syrian air defense systems operate from a deeply defensive position repelling rockets and guided bombs. Israeli has a general advantage in this context, while the IDF’s capabilities allow it to deploy attack tactics that overwhelm Syrian air defenses.”
Thirdly, Moscow seems to be faced with the general problem of putting together an effective communication strategy in relation to the Israeli new government. On one hand, the Kremlin was flattered by Netanyahu’s praise of the quality of his relations with the Russian president. Nevertheless, Moscow is now struggling to strengthen institutional foundations for the bilateral relationship with Israel to prove that it rests on something more than the personal rapport between Putin and Netanyahu. On the other hand, Moscow’s efforts to conduct multi-vector diplomacy had on several occasions landed it in a difficult spot. One may recall Russian Ambassador Anatoly Viktorov complaining about Israel’s destabilizing policies in the Middle East exceeding those of Iran. Those statements came shortly after Putin’s emotional speech at the unveiling of the Memorial Candle monument in Jerusalem, where he spoke against the revision of the WWII history. The Russian president’s address was notable as it was the first time he weighed on the topic of the WWII history on the foreign soil.
Another point concerns Israeli’s warming of relations with Ukraine that took shape during Netanyahu’s reign. President Vladimir Zelensky was also among the first world leaders whom Naftali Bennett called after becoming the head of the Israeli government. It is thus not beyond reason to suggest that this warming up — and the omissions made on the track of relations with Israel — may be the reason some investigative journalists are sharing reports about the possible dismissal of Filipp Illichev, a deputy head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Russian Presidency. The department is headed by the Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov and has evolved into a think tank of sorts that accumulates opinions from the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs and security officials. It is reported that the analysts’ views on the outcome of the last election in Israeli wrongly predicted victory for Netanyahu.
That said, one should not dismiss the role of Israeli policy. Israel lacks depth of its strategic defenses and therefore needs to adopt preventative measures to limit possible threats. This caution is the reason the Israeli army continues to conduct airstrikes in Syrian territory. Yet questions remain as to whether Israel will really change how far in advance it will warn the Russians about a coming attack. Changes in the Israeli political landscape could play a role in such a change, especially given Israel’s complaints concerning the 2018 reconciliation agreement between the Syrian opposition and Damascus that should have put limits on the growth of Hezbollah’s cultural centers and Iranian sites in the southwest of Syria.
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