Ben Caspit : L'escalation con Hamas gioverà a Netanyahu?
L'attuale round di violenza scoppiata il 10 maggio tra Israele e Hamas ha due aspetti insoliti.
Il primo è senza precedenti. Per la prima volta in assoluto, un'organizzazione terroristica relativamente minore come Hamas ha presentato un ultimatum a una grande potenza militare come Israele , chiedendo il ritiro di tutte le sue forze di sicurezza da due punti critici di Gerusalemme: il complesso della moschea di Al-Aqsa e il quartiere di Sheikh Jarrah. Hamas ha persino fissato un orario specifico: le 18:00
Israele ovviamente ha ignorato la minaccia e ha proseguito con le celebrazioni annuali del Giorno di Gerusalemme,ma esattamente alle 18:00 Hamas ha lanciato sei razzi verso Gerusalemme. Uno è atterrato alla periferia della città, provocando danni ma nessuna vittima. Tuttavia, le sirene hanno interrotto la parata annuale della bandiera ebraica attraverso Gerusalemme est, spingendo i partecipanti a fuggire per cercare riparo, mentre i legislatori sono stati evacuati dalla plenaria della Knesset dove era in corso una sessione annuale speciale che segnava la vittoria degli Alleati sui nazisti. Le scene, trasmesse in diretta, hanno fornito ad Hamas le prove della vittoria, colto Israele impreparato e preso in giro le dichiarazioni vanagloriose di alti esponenti israeliani nelle ultime settimane.
Il secondo aspetto unico di questo round di violenza tra Israele e la Striscia di Gaza è forse ancora più affascinante: nei suoi momenti più difficili, mentre combatte per la sua sopravvivenza politica e la sua libertà personale, il primo ministro Benjamin Netanyahu riceve un aiuto inaspettato dal suo alleato veterano,il movimento di Hamas.
L'attacco missilistico è esploso il giorno in cui i membri della Knesset Naftali Bennett e Yair Lapid, capi dei partiti Yamina e Yesh Atid, si stavano preparando a dire al presidente Reuven Rivlin che erano riusciti a formare un nuovo governo. I sei partiti del cosiddetto blocco per il cambiamento hanno condotto negli ultimi giorni intensi negoziati, finalizzando la maggior parte dei loro accordi di coalizione. Rimangono solo alcune lacune finali da colmare prima che il blocco possa realizzare l'impresa quasi impossibile di sostituire Netanyahu. Poi si è scatenato l'inferno, con razzi volanti, aerei israeliani che hanno colpito obiettivi di Gaza e scontri tra la polizia israeliana e cittadini arabi, per lo più in città miste arabo-ebraiche.
Gli sviluppi hanno costretto il membro della Knesset Mansour Abbas, capo del partito islamista Ra'am, a chiedere un timeout sui negoziati di coalizione che aveva condotto nel tentativo di diventare il primo partito politico arabo in un governo israeliano. Ra'am è affiliato ideologicamente ad Hamas, Abbas non poteva permettersi di firmare accordi di coalizione con Israele mentre le forze governative si scontravano con i suoi fratelli a Gaza. Alla fine, Hamas avrebbe potuto offrire a Netanyahu la sua ultima ancora di salvezza, ricompensandolo per le sue posizioni politiche e di sicurezza negli ultimi dieci anni. Dal punto di vista di Hamas, le posizioni di Netanyahu avevano effettivamente giovato al gruppo.
Le teorie del complotto sono diffuse. Alcuni sostengono che Netanyahu abbia deliberatamente progettato l' escalation delle tensioni a Gerusalemme , usando il suo stretto collaboratore e scagnozzo, il ministro della Pubblica Sicurezza Amir Ohana, che, a sua volta, ha attivato il suo nuovo Commissario di polizia Yaakov Shabtai.
Ma come si sono svolti gli eventi? Le tensioni sono iniziate il mese scorso nel quartiere prevalentemente palestinese di Sheikh Jarrah, innescate da una prolungata controversia legale tra ebrei che cercavano di sfrattare i palestinesi dalle loro case, una mossa sostenuta da una sentenza del tribunale. La tensione si è diffusa da lì al punto più instabile sulla faccia della terra: la moschea di Al-Aqsa. La bizzarra decisione della polizia il mese scorso di posizionare barriere metalliche vicino alla Porta di Damasco nella Città Vecchia per interrompere i tradizionali raduni serali del mese del Ramadan nel sito, ha generato scontri notturni, prima nell'area del cancello e successivamente al complesso di Al-Aqsa. Poi è arrivato l'ultimatum di Hamas.
Ogni anno il 10 maggio, il giorno di Gerusalemme, gli ebrei israeliani celebrano l'unificazione della città dopo aver assunto la sua parte orientale nella Guerra dei Sei Giorni del 1967, 54 anni fa. Per la prima volta in assoluto, una forza esterna - Hamas - è riuscita a interrompere le celebrazioni, inclusa la parata della bandiera che molti musulmani considerano una provocazione annuale, dominando l'agenda regionale e spingendo l'Autorità Palestinese (AP) ai margini più lontani.
Mettendo da parte le implicazioni politiche di questo focolaio, Netanyahu sta ora raccogliendo ciò che ha seminato da quando è tornato al potere nel 2009 con la promessa di distruggere Hamas. Negli anni successivi, per come la vedono gli analisti, aveva in pratica stretto un'alleanza con il gruppo. Evitando uno scontro a tutto campo con l'organizzazione, l'aveva difesa. Aveva anche contribuito a raccogliere fondi per finanziarlo, consentendo l'assistenza straniera. Tutto questo è diventato abbondantemente chiaro nella guerra del 2014 con Gaza, nome in codice Operation Protective Edge. Netanyahu semplicemente non era interessato a far cadere Hamas, al contrario: voleva un Hamas forte e un'Autorità Palestinese debole e balbettante. Il risultato è un gruppo forte e sicuro di sé che ora potrebbe anche rendergli un ottimo servizio.
Nonostante tutta la sua retorica bellicosa Netanyahu si muove con cautela, pragmatismo e un'intensa avversione per le avventure militari. Nei prossimi giorni scopriremo se le sue disperate difficoltà politiche e legali hanno un impatto su questi tratti fondamentali. Paradossalmente, i continui scontri con Hamas minano le prospettive di un nuovo governo in sostituzione di Netanyahu. La legge concede a Lapid poco più di tre settimane per formare un nuovo governo, suggerendo che lo scontro militare con Hamas potrebbe durare così a lungo. Alle forze di difesa israeliane (IDF) è stato ordinato di rispondere duramente ai razzi di Hamas su Gerusalemme e l'aviazione ha bombardato obiettivi multipli nelle ore notturne tra il 10 e l'11 maggio. Netanyahu andrà fino in fondo questa volta, o tornerà a il suo solito schema di lotta per una rapida fine dei combattimenti?
Un altro aspetto preoccupante riguarda l'elemento sorpresa. Le valutazioni dell'intelligence militare nelle ultime settimane hanno sostenuto che Hamas non stava cercando uno scontro prolungato con Israele. Questa analisi si è basata in gran parte sulle mosse di Yahya Sinwar, "l'uomo forte" di Hamas a Gaza, che si è concentrato sull'alleviare la crisi umanitaria nell'enclave e sul rafforzamento del suo governo. A quanto pare, l'intelligence israeliana non ha identificato la portata della sorprendente minaccia di pochi giorni fa da parte di Mohammed Deif, leader dell'ala militare di Hamas in secondo piano per anni.
Deif è stato colui che ha scatenato la saga della minaccia contro Israele la scorsa settimana, e la sua improvvisa apparizione (solo con la voce) sembra aver spostato l'equilibrio del potere nella Striscia di Gaza quasi dall'oggi al domani. Israele crede che Sinwar non avesse altra scelta che andare d'accordo con l'ala militare. Hamas sta anche vivendo una lotta di potere tra la sua leadership al di fuori di Gaza (Khaled Meshaal e Salah al-Arouri) e a Gaza (Ismail Haniyeh e Sinwar), con il gruppo esterno che spinge per il confronto con Israele , mentre Sinwar preferisce la calma che gli consentirebbe di migliorare le condizioni in cui vivono i residenti dell'enclave.
Nel 2014, alla vigilia dell'operazione Margine di protezione, i servizi segreti militari hanno valutato che Hamas non stava cercando uno scontro. Quindi, i combattimenti sono durati 51 giorni. Questa volta, tutti, forse ad eccezione di Netanyahu, sperano che sia più breve.
The current round of violence that erupted May 10 between Israel and Hamas has two unusual aspects.
The first is unprecedented. For the first time ever, a relatively minor terrorist organization such as Hamas presented a major military power such as Israel with an ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of all its security forces from two Jerusalem flashpoints — Al-Aqsa Mosque compound and Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. Hamas even set a specific time — 6 p.m.
Israel obviously ignored the threat and went ahead with the annual Jerusalem Day celebrations. But at exactly 6 p.m., Hamas fired six rockets toward Jerusalem. One landed on the city’s outskirts, causing damage but no casualties. However, the sirens warning of the incoming rockets disrupted the annual Jewish flag parade through East Jerusalem, sending participants fleeing for shelter, while lawmakers were evacuated from the Knesset plenary where a special annual session was underway marking the Allied victory over the Nazis. The scenes, aired live, provided Hamas with dramatic victory photos, caught Israel unprepared and made a mockery of the boastful statements by senior Israeli figures in recent weeks.
The second unique aspect of this round of violence between Israel and the Gaza Strip is perhaps even more fascinating: At his toughest moments, as he battles for his political survival and personal freedom, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is getting some unexpected help from his veteran ally, the Hamas movement.
The rocket attack erupted on the day that Knesset members Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, heads of the Yamina and Yesh Atid parties, were preparing to tell President Reuven Rivlin that they had managed to form a new government. The six parties of the so-called bloc for change had been conducting intense negotiations in recent days, finalizing most of their coalition agreements. Only a few final gaps remained to be bridged before the bloc could achieve the almost impossible feat of replacing Netanyahu. Then, all hell broke loose, with rockets flying, Israeli planes striking Gaza targets and clashes erupting between Israeli Police and Arab citizens, mostly in mixed Jewish-Arab towns.
The developments forced Knesset member Mansour Abbas, head of the Islamist Ra’am party, to ask for timeout from the coalition negotiations he had been conducting in a bid to become the first Arab political party with a foothold in an Israeli government. Ra’am is affiliated ideologically with Hamas, and Abbas could not afford to sign coalition deals with Israel while government forces were clashing with his brothers in Gaza. Ultimately, Hamas might have offered Netanyahu his final lifeline, rewarding him for his political and security stances over the past decade. From Hamas’ point of view, Netanyahu’s positions had actually benefitted the group.
Conspiracy theories are rife. Some argue that Netanyahu deliberately engineered the escalation of tensions in Jerusalem, using his close aide and henchman, Public Security Minister Amir Ohana, who, in turn, activated his newly appointed Police Commissioner Yaakov Shabtai.
But how did events unfold? Tensions began last month in the predominantly Palestinian Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, sparked by a prolonged legal dispute between Jews seeking to evict Palestinians from their homes, a move backed by a court ruling. The tension spread from there to the most volatile flashpoint on the face of the earth — Al-Aqsa Mosque. The bizarre police decision last month to place metal barriers near the Damascus Gate to the Old City in order to disrupt the traditional Ramadan month evening gatherings at the site, generated nightly clashes, at first in the gate area and subsequently at Al-Aqsa compound. Then came the Hamas ultimatum.
Each year on May 10, on Jerusalem Day, Israeli Jews celebrate the unification of the city after taking over its eastern part in the 1967 Six-Day War, 54 years ago. For the first time ever, an external force — Hamas — managed to disrupt the celebrations, including the flag parade that many Muslims view as an annual provocation, dominating the regional agenda and pushing the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the farthest sidelines.
Setting aside the political implications of this outbreak, Netanyahu is now reaping what he sowed since he returned to power in 2009 on a pledge to destroy Hamas. In the ensuing years, the way analysts see it, he had in practice forged an alliance with the group. By avoiding an all-out clash with the organization, he had been defending it. He had also assisted in raising money to fund it, by means of enabling foreign assistance. All this became abundantly clear in the 2014 war with Gaza, codenamed Operation Protective Edge. Netanyahu was simply not interested in bringing down Hamas, on the contrary: He wanted a strong Hamas and a weak, stuttering PA. The result is a strong, self-confident group that is now getting in his face — but may also be doing him a great service.
For all his belligerent rhetoric, Netanyahu’s record reflects caution, pragmatism and intense dislike of military adventures. In the coming days we will find out whether his desperate political and legal straits have an impact on these core traits. Paradoxically, continued clashes with Hamas undermine the prospects of a new government to replace Netanyahu. The law gives Lapid just over three weeks to form a new government, prompting speculation that the military clash with Hamas could last that long. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were ordered to respond harshly to the Hamas rockets on Jerusalem and the air force bombed multiple targets in the night hours between May 10 and May 11. Will Netanyahu go all the way this time, or will he revert to his usual pattern of striving for a speedy end to the fighting?
Yet another troubling aspect relates to the element of surprise. Military intelligence assessments in recent weeks argued that Hamas was not seeking an extended clash with Israel. This analysis was based largely on the character and moves of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas “strongman” in Gaza, who has been focused on alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the enclave and shoring up his rule. Apparently, Israeli intelligence did not identify the import of the surprising threat a few days ago by Mohammed Deif, leader of the Hamas military wing who had been lying low for years.
Deif was the one who set off the threat saga against Israel last week, and his sudden appearance (in voice only) appears to have shifted the balance of power in the Gaza Strip almost overnight. Israel believes Sinwar had little choice but to go along with the military wing. Hamas is also experiencing a power struggle between its leadership outside Gaza (Khaled Meshaal and Salah al-Arouri), and in Gaza (Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar), with the external group pushing for confrontation with Israel and displaying militancy, while Sinwar prefers calm that would allow him to improve the conditions under which the enclave’s residents live.
In 2014, on the eve of Operation Protective Edge, Military Intelligence assessed that Hamas was not seeking confrontation. Then, the fighting lasted 51 days. This time, everyone — possibly with the exception of Netanyahu — is hoping it will be shorter.
The current round of violence that erupted May 10 between Israel and Hamas has two unusual aspects.
The first is unprecedented. For the first time ever, a relatively minor terrorist organization such as Hamas presented a major military power such as Israel with an ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of all its security forces from two Jerusalem flashpoints — Al-Aqsa Mosque compound and Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. Hamas even set a specific time — 6 p.m.
Israel obviously ignored the threat and went ahead with the annual Jerusalem Day celebrations. But at exactly 6 p.m., Hamas fired six rockets toward Jerusalem. One landed on the city’s outskirts, causing damage but no casualties. However, the sirens warning of the incoming rockets disrupted the annual Jewish flag parade through East Jerusalem, sending participants fleeing for shelter, while lawmakers were evacuated from the Knesset plenary where a special annual session was underway marking the Allied victory over the Nazis. The scenes, aired live, provided Hamas with dramatic victory photos, caught Israel unprepared and made a mockery of the boastful statements by senior Israeli figures in recent weeks.
The second unique aspect of this round of violence between Israel and the Gaza Strip is perhaps even more fascinating: At his toughest moments, as he battles for his political survival and personal freedom, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is getting some unexpected help from his veteran ally, the Hamas movement.
The rocket attack erupted on the day that Knesset members Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, heads of the Yamina and Yesh Atid parties, were preparing to tell President Reuven Rivlin that they had managed to form a new government. The six parties of the so-called bloc for change had been conducting intense negotiations in recent days, finalizing most of their coalition agreements. Only a few final gaps remained to be bridged before the bloc could achieve the almost impossible feat of replacing Netanyahu. Then, all hell broke loose, with rockets flying, Israeli planes striking Gaza targets and clashes erupting between Israeli Police and Arab citizens, mostly in mixed Jewish-Arab towns.
The developments forced Knesset member Mansour Abbas, head of the Islamist Ra’am party, to ask for timeout from the coalition negotiations he had been conducting in a bid to become the first Arab political party with a foothold in an Israeli government. Ra’am is affiliated ideologically with Hamas, and Abbas could not afford to sign coalition deals with Israel while government forces were clashing with his brothers in Gaza. Ultimately, Hamas might have offered Netanyahu his final lifeline, rewarding him for his political and security stances over the past decade. From Hamas’ point of view, Netanyahu’s positions had actually benefitted the group.
Conspiracy theories are rife. Some argue that Netanyahu deliberately engineered the escalation of tensions in Jerusalem, using his close aide and henchman, Public Security Minister Amir Ohana, who, in turn, activated his newly appointed Police Commissioner Yaakov Shabtai.
But how did events unfold? Tensions began last month in the predominantly Palestinian Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, sparked by a prolonged legal dispute between Jews seeking to evict Palestinians from their homes, a move backed by a court ruling. The tension spread from there to the most volatile flashpoint on the face of the earth — Al-Aqsa Mosque. The bizarre police decision last month to place metal barriers near the Damascus Gate to the Old City in order to disrupt the traditional Ramadan month evening gatherings at the site, generated nightly clashes, at first in the gate area and subsequently at Al-Aqsa compound. Then came the Hamas ultimatum.
Each year on May 10, on Jerusalem Day, Israeli Jews celebrate the unification of the city after taking over its eastern part in the 1967 Six-Day War, 54 years ago. For the first time ever, an external force — Hamas — managed to disrupt the celebrations, including the flag parade that many Muslims view as an annual provocation, dominating the regional agenda and pushing the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the farthest sidelines.
Setting aside the political implications of this outbreak, Netanyahu is now reaping what he sowed since he returned to power in 2009 on a pledge to destroy Hamas. In the ensuing years, the way analysts see it, he had in practice forged an alliance with the group. By avoiding an all-out clash with the organization, he had been defending it. He had also assisted in raising money to fund it, by means of enabling foreign assistance. All this became abundantly clear in the 2014 war with Gaza, codenamed Operation Protective Edge. Netanyahu was simply not interested in bringing down Hamas, on the contrary: He wanted a strong Hamas and a weak, stuttering PA. The result is a strong, self-confident group that is now getting in his face — but may also be doing him a great service.
For all his belligerent rhetoric, Netanyahu’s record reflects caution, pragmatism and intense dislike of military adventures. In the coming days we will find out whether his desperate political and legal straits have an impact on these core traits. Paradoxically, continued clashes with Hamas undermine the prospects of a new government to replace Netanyahu. The law gives Lapid just over three weeks to form a new government, prompting speculation that the military clash with Hamas could last that long. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were ordered to respond harshly to the Hamas rockets on Jerusalem and the air force bombed multiple targets in the night hours between May 10 and May 11. Will Netanyahu go all the way this time, or will he revert to his usual pattern of striving for a speedy end to the fighting?
Yet another troubling aspect relates to the element of surprise. Military intelligence assessments in recent weeks argued that Hamas was not seeking an extended clash with Israel. This analysis was based largely on the character and moves of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas “strongman” in Gaza, who has been focused on alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the enclave and shoring up his rule. Apparently, Israeli intelligence did not identify the import of the surprising threat a few days ago by Mohammed Deif, leader of the Hamas military wing who had been lying low for years.
Deif was the one who set off the threat saga against Israel last week, and his sudden appearance (in voice only) appears to have shifted the balance of power in the Gaza Strip almost overnight. Israel believes Sinwar had little choice but to go along with the military wing. Hamas is also experiencing a power struggle between its leadership outside Gaza (Khaled Meshaal and Salah al-Arouri), and in Gaza (Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar), with the external group pushing for confrontation with Israel and displaying militancy, while Sinwar prefers calm that would allow him to improve the conditions under which the enclave’s residents live.
In 2014, on the eve of Operation Protective Edge, Military Intelligence assessed that Hamas was not seeking confrontation. Then, the fighting lasted 51 days. This time, everyone — possibly with the exception of Netanyahu — is hoping it will be shorter.
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