Amir Oren As Syria Heats Up, Netanyahu Goes Missing in Action
As Syria heats up, Netanyahu goes missing in action
***Speedy
getaway? Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaking during a dedication
ceremony for a new interchange in Jerusalem, September 7, 2017.
RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS
September
1973. Prime Minister Golda Meir meets with King Hussein of Jordan at a
Mossad guesthouse. He tells her the Syrian army is poised to attack, and
the war is likely to include Egypt as well. Her response: The Rosh
Hashanah holiday, a trip to Strasbourg, a side trip to a transit camp
for Jews from the Soviet Union and belittlement of the warning. Her
deputy, Yigal Allon, wasn’t informed of most of the intelligence during
that fateful week.
December
1987. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin is touring Latin America. In the
Gaza Strip, and later the West Bank, a strange kind of unrest erupts, an
“intifada.” Rabin doesn’t cut short his trip. If you’re already
bothering to go so far away, it’s a pity to offend your hosts – and in
any case, there’s an acting defense minister, Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shamir. The army fails to control the disturbances; Rabin’s belated
arrival is fateful for the effort to diagnose the new situation and set a
suitable policy.
September 2017. Syria claims the Israel Air Force attacked a facility in its territory. A forceful response is possible, albeit not guaranteed. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
packs his bags for a long trip to both North and South America. It’s
truly essential to visit Colombia and Argentina right now, when he has
no permanent, fully briefed deputy, no foreign minister and an unserious
defense minister. The latter, Avigdor Lieberman, is more interested in
media broadcasts than missile launches. And Netanyahu is far from being
on the same level as Meir and Rabin, or Shamir’s judgment in a crisis.
One could understand a day and a half at the UN General Assembly and another pointless meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump.
But to take time for touring and entertainment, when Tierra del Fuego
(the Land of Fire) is here? When the northern front is liable to ignite?
Just to be intoxicated by the views and leave his tresses with a New
York hairstylist? And who will be in charge back home when his crony,
coalition whip David Bitan, has yet to even be sworn in as a cabinet
minister?
Logic dictates that there will be no escalation.
This isn’t the right moment for Syrian President Bashar Assad to avenge
his wounded pride. The House of Assad has always known how to keep its
priorities straight. Staying in power comes first; the conflict with
Israel, including regaining the Golan Heights or a military conflict,
only afterward.
Now
that he’s on the verge of winning Syria’s civil war, it would be wrong
for Assad to open a new front with a strong country that has hitherto
restrained itself, especially since it’s not clear the Russians would
let him.
But
logic doesn’t obligate Assad. He’s capable of shedding his brutal
coolness and acting emotionally, with planes or missiles targeting
Israeli targets near or far, with or without an official announcement.
In
the last terror attack Syria was accused of planning, in 1986, an El Al
plane was nearly blown up (the plot was ultimately thwarted). Hafez
Assad, Bashar’s father, wouldn’t confirm that he was involved, but
nevertheless let everyone know he was and that Syria wasn’t powerless,
even if in the last aerial battle between the two militaries a few
months earlier, Israel had won 2-0.
Israel’s defense establishment must be on alert for a possible Syrian response, and it seems the Israel Defense Forces is prepared for this.
The Northern Command’s war drill this week was originally and
arbitrarily aimed solely at the Lebanese front. A different scenario
would seemingly have been called for, one that began at the Lebanese
border but then developed and spread to the neighboring Syrian arena,
since this was a rare opportunity to drill both halves of Northern
Command. But separating these theaters enables the command to focus on
one simulated effort while remaining attentive to other developments –
which could arise during a war.
Unlike
with Trump’s barrage of Tomahawk missiles at Syria’s chemical weaponry
in April, not a peep has been heard from Israel’s leadership. The order
to maintain radio silence has been obeyed, for the sake of creating a
space of plausible deniability within which Assad can maneuver. The U.S.
strike, which was meant to punish Assad for using chemical weapons as
opposed to merely making them, seemingly legitimized Israel’s operation.
In
contrast, the reports of Iranian missile facilities in Lebanon don’t
seem ripe for action. There’s a substantive difference between plans and
preparations, and between both of those and intent to carry out what
was planned and prepared.
The
missile factories, as far as is known, haven’t yet passed the stage of
plans on paper and excavating some dirt. Any preemptive strike on them
is still a long way off. But this week’s alleged operation reminded
everyone that, when the time comes, this won’t be science fiction.
Israel
believes Assad. When he threatens, it’s not mere boasting. And he
issued his first threat to “respond next time” nearly 15 years ago,
following an airstrike on the outskirts of Damascus. If he didn’t carry
out his threat, it’s because Israel learned to refrain from verbal
provocations. Veterans of the Northern Command know that generals from
the generation of Rabin, David Elazar and Motta Gur wouldn’t have missed
the opportunity for a public announcement over an event like this. But
the new head of Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Yoel Strick, refrained from
teasing.
Improving
on the advice to novice diplomats to send lots of cables lauding even
fictitious activity (“If you did it and didn’t report it, you didn’t do
it; if you did it and reported it, you did it”), one could say that
Israeli policy for the past two or three prime ministers, three or four
defense ministers, and three or four chiefs of staff has been: “If you
did it and didn’t announce it, you didn’t push the enemy to respond.”
You don’t mix words with missiles. If you talk, don’t shoot, and if you
shoot, keep quiet.
IDF
operations don’t always have to be aerial – and if they are aerial,
they don’t always have to involve fighter planes. There are other means,
in the air and on the ground, at sea and in cyberspace. But to the
extent that the spotlight is trained on the air force, this seems to
have been a smooth entry into office for its new commander, Maj. Gen.
Amikam Norkin.
Until
a few months ago, the General Staff contained two other air force
generals in addition to Norkin’s predecessor, Amir Eshel – Norkin
himself in the planning directorate and Hagai Topolansky in the manpower
directorate. Eshel and Topolansky have resigned and no brigadier
general from the air force has yet been promoted, so Norkin remains the
only air force veteran in the national cockpit. We can rely on him, and
on the chief of staff and Military Intelligence.
Nevertheless,
it would be nice – even if it’s just a matter of tradition and custom –
to also have a prime minister in the vicinity to exercise authority and
take responsibility.
Amir Oren
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