Zvi Bar'el |: Middle East Strange bedfellows against Islamic State

Strange bedfellows against Islamic State - Middle East

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A loud welcome greeted Untied States Secretary of State John Kerry on his arrival in Baghdad on Wednesday. Two car bombs exploded in the heart of the Iraqi capital, leaving in their wake at least 11 victims.

Car bombs and explosive devices are part of the routine in Iraq. The kidnapping of a female Kurdish businesswoman by masked men, as she came out of a bank in Basra, also didn’t cause a big stir.

Of more interest is the decision by the Basra regional council to grant the families of volunteer civilian victims who died while fighting the Islamic State plots for building a house as well as a sum of $20,000. Civilian volunteers have become an integral part of Iraqi defense forces, operating not only on the front lines in places in which IS is active, but also as urban armed guards.

Alongside the military, police and volunteers, every political faction has its own private militia, which usually has the role of protecting its leaders and preventing other militias from taking over power centers.

These independent forces are financed directly by government ministries headed by ministers belonging to the party which “owns” each militia. This fact underlies disputes relating to the allocation of well-funded cabinet portfolios – disputes that could disrupt the composition of the newly formed government. They could even lead to its dissolution, unless a quick solution is found to satisfy the demands of various Iraqi movements and sects.

Thus, for example, veteran Shi’ite politician Hussain al-Shahristani has threatened not to join the new government, ratified this week by Iraq’s parliament after an enormous political effort, unless he is given a significant portfolio such as the prestigious Oil Ministry, which commands most of the country’s revenues.

Al-Shahristani, a Western-educated expert on nuclear issues, was oil minister until 2010, serving recently as interim foreign minister. He replaced the Kurdish Hoshyar Zebari, who received the low-budgeted Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. With such a portfolio it is difficult to build a support base or finance special security forces.

The Kurds, whose representatives did not take part in the parliamentary decision to ratify the government, only agreed to support it on condition that within three months the prime minister will hold serious negotiations with them on meeting their demands.

Their main demands are that the government repays a financial debt to the Kurds, which they claim amounts to 8 billion dollars, and that the Kurds be allowed to freely export oil extracted within their territory.

Their threat to secede is no secret. Just as they boycotted the former government led by Nouri al-Maliki, they could withdraw their support from the new one as well. The Kurds don’t have a problem with the portfolios they received. Iraq’s president, Fouad Masoum, is a Kurd. Former Foreign Minister Zebari was appointed deputy prime minister, and Kurds also have their independent financial sources.

The current political tussle revolves around the appointments of defense and interior ministers. These are key positions that oversee security forces and enjoy huge budgets. Whoever is awarded these posts will also head the Iraqi forces that join the international coalition now being cobbled together by President Barack Obama ahead of the assault on Islamic State.

It turned out this week that the new prime minister is not totally independent when it comes to making these appointments. Thus, when he tried to appoint Hadi al-Amiri as interior minister, he encountered an American veto. This was based on the fact that Amiri was the head of the Badr organization, the military wing of the Shi’ite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and on fears that his appointment would disrupt the intended collaboration with Sunnis.

Beyond this formal argument is the fact that Amiri is considered to be very close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. A close friend is Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, whom the United States suspects as being instrumental in smuggling Iranian arms to the Assad regime.

Washington notified Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi that appointing Amiri was “not a good choice,” causing his name to be dropped from the list. There is already harsh criticism of American intervention in the appointment process, particularly by U.S. ambassador Stuart E. Jones, who has been labelled the new “high commissioner.”

The United States is not impressed with this criticism in light of the deep involvement of Iran in Iraqi politics. Even though the United States and Iran deny any cooperation between them, it is no coincidence that they both support appointments made by Abadi.

Although the new government has been ratified, expectations that it will spearhead a rapid incorporation of Sunnis into Iraq’s political life – thus facilitating their enlistment in the fight against IS – have not been met.

Sunni tribal leaders are reporting the establishment of armed militias in Anbar province, currently ruled by IS, as well as armed clashes with Islamist forces. However, the province’s commander says these volunteers are not adequately armed to enable them to resist the invaders.

The supply of weapons is the lesser problem. The greater one is winning the Sunni tribesmen’s trust in the new government. The Sunnis, who have experienced betrayal by Iraq’s government in the past, now demand international guarantees that they will not be short-changed, but there is currently no international force capable of ensuring that the Abadi government fulfils any promises it makes.

The irony is that the same Sunni tribes on which Iraq and coalition states are pinning their hopes in the ground campaign against IS are the ones who fought the Americans in the early stages of the U.S. occupation. Some of the Shi’ite militias that are being mobilized in the fight against IS are the same ones that fought Iraq’s army in 2008, and the bad blood between them and the government has not been resolved.

In light of the tangle of rivalries and internal political disputes, it seems it will be easier to garner support from regional states such as Iran than from Iraqi forces who scattered to the winds with the onset of the IS onslaught last June.

Even the construction of an Arab coalition, with leaders convening Thursday in Saudi Arabia, can be likened to hitching a train to two separate engines. Thus, the Saudis did not invite Iran to the meeting, since it demanded that Syrian President Bashar Assad be invited as well – based on the fact that his forces are the most significant ones that can stand up to IS in Syria.

The United States also objected, since it still supports the removal of Assad. The Saudis also have grave concerns that the inclusion of Iran will undermine their own role in leading the coalition, granting it an honorable entry into the Arab Middle East.

The Saudi position hampers the Americans, who view Iran not only as a crucial component in the fight against IS, but also as a state that sees eye to eye with the Americans regarding the importance of establishing an inclusive Iraqi government, which will allay Sunni concerns.

The closeness between the United States and Iran is giving the Saudis stomach cramps. They assess that this is a strategic shift by the Americans, which could threaten them even more than IS does. Articles published in American media in recent days, which increasingly call for the inclusion of Iran and even linking up again with the Assad regime in the fight against IS, are carefully read in Saudi Arabia as well.

One newspaper in the Gulf carried a report this week claiming that the Saudis were considering renewing diplomatic ties with Assad. This was denied out of hand, but it should be remembered that in 2010 Saudi King Abdullah renewed his ties with Assad in a surprise move, after years of alienation.

Rebel militias supported by the Saudis are not achieving any significant successes. This week, one of these groups, Ahrar ash-Sham, suffered a critical blow when all its commanders were killed in a large explosion in Idlib province. All these facts may push the Saudis into reassessing their relations with Assad.

Ironically, it may turn out that IS, which wishes to erase the borders of nation-states in the Middle East, may lead to the establishment of a new map, the importance of which surpasses even the struggle against the organization.