Israele-Gaza : leggi di guerra e diritto internazionale umanitario

 

  Sintesi personale
1: Israele non può "difendersi" con ogni mezzo.
Ci sono leggi di guerra  conosciute collettivamente come diritto internazionale umanitario (DIU) al fine  di ridurre al minimo gli effetti della guerra.
Il diritto internazionale umanitario si applica a Israele e  all' ala militare di Hamas. Io non sto concentrando sulle milizie di Gaza perché, nonostante le loro sincere intenzioni di commettere crimini di guerra, i danni che  prvocano impallidiscono in confronto alle violazioni di Israele. Negli ultimi 11 anni, il lancio di razzi da Gaza ha causato la morte di 17 israeliani ; negli ultimi due giorni, gli attacchi israeliani a Gaza hanno ucciso 35 palestinesi.
   
2: Non vi è alcun senso legale del termine "militante".
  "Militante" non ha alcun significato in diritto internazionale umanitario. Ci sono solo due tipi di persone in DIU: civili e combattenti. L'appartenenza a un partito politico, come Hamas, non rende qualcuno un combattente.
Nei primi 5 giorni  di Operazione Piombo Fuso nel 2008-2009, 3 dei 4 israeliani  uccisi sono stati classificati come "civili" ,  questa è stata una corretta classificazione, anche se è probabile che tutti e tre hanno servito nell'esercito israeliano. Al contrario, le relazioni sulle morti palestinesi durante lo stesso periodo ha riportato solo le donne ei bambini uccisi (9 donne e 37 bambini) come civili, lasciando  intendere  che  gli altri morti  erano  in qualche modo impegnati in combattimento. Da dati della Mezzaluna rossa palestinese ( www.palestinercs.org ), del  Palestine Center for umani Diritti Gaza ( www.pchrgaza.org ) e di B 'Tselem ( www.btselem.org ) ,oltre alle investigazioni di quanto avvenuto,risulta che la maggior parte delle persone uccise non erano combattenti. 
   
3: Attaccare i civili è vietato.
   
 Il principio più importante del diritto internazionale umanitario è il divieto di attaccare la popolazione civile e obiettivi civili. Solo obiettivi militari possono essere mirati.
Un obiettivo militare " offre un vantaggio militare preciso ", secondo convenzione di Ginevra  . Se non c'è la prova che  un obiettivo civile  è stato convertito  ad uso militare, si deve presumere   che sia un obiettivo civile.
Durante l'Operazione Piombo Fuso, Israele colpì numerosi obiettivi civili, tra cui case, moschee, un centro fitness, una università, una farmacia, edifici governativi e stazioni di polizia civili; già durante l'Operazione bordo Difensivo, case e un allevamento di pollame sono stati  considerati bersagli . Nonostante le affermazioni di Israele   che tutto ciò che  è correlato ad Hamas  è un obiettivo legittimo;Hamas ha un'ala militare e un'ala civile in quanto governa  (Hamas può attaccare una base militare israeliana, ma non può legittimamente attaccare il Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione.)

4: Anche se la destinazione è un obiettivo militare, Israele deve considerare il danno civile previsto.
  
"Unattacco deve   considerare  se i   i danni determinati da tale  azione militare,  risulterebbero eccessivi  per i civili rispetto al vantaggio militare concreto e  previsto"
Israele non prende di mira i civili, ma incidentalmente li uccide a causa della loro vicinanza a obiettivi militari. Gaza, con una popolazione di 1,5 milioni in un'area di 140 chilometri quadrati, è uno dei luoghi più densamente popolate del pianeta. Questo pone considerazioni speciali per qualsiasi attacco militare.
At least 35 Palestinians have been killed and over 300 wounded in Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip in the first two nights of “Operation Protective Edge.”  As Israel calls up thousands of army reservists for a potential ground assault, the deaths will likely increase even as their human cost is buried by misleading news and government reports.
News about Gaza can be confusing because it is hard to ascertain clear facts about a faraway place where reporters often are limited from entering or moving freely.  It is further complicated by the failure of media and various governments to apply international law correctly, and to instead accept definitions from the players themselves about the legitimacy of their military goals and actions.  Understanding what is happening in Gaza, and who is dying, is important because it happens with American aid, weapons, and complicity.  Understanding principles of international law is critical if we want a world that abides by rule of law.
Principle #1:  Israel cannot “defend itself” by any means.
There are laws of war, and they apply to all states.  Known collectively as international humanitarian law (IHL), they are made of a number of international conventions, including the universally-accepted Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, and widely-accepted principles known as “customary international law.” The main purpose of IHL is to minimize the effects of war.
IHL applies to Israel and to Hamas’s military wing or independent Palestinian militias.  I’m not focusing on the Gazan militias because, despite their sincere intentions to commit war crimes, the damage they have wrought pales in comparison to Israel’s violations.  In the past 11 years, rocket fire from Gaza has claimed 17 Israeli lives; in the past two days, Israeli attacks in Gaza have killed 35 Palestinians.
Principle #2:  There is no legal meaning to the term “militant.” 
“Militant” is used as often to describe fighters as it is to describe vegans and feminists; it has no meaning in IHL.  There are only two types of people in IHL:  civilians and combatants.  A person’s status isn’t static:  a civilian who takes up arms becomes a combatant, much like an off-duty army reservist is a civilian.  For example, a woman who served in the Israeli army (as all Israelis are required to do) but is now escorting her children to school is a civilian.  Membership in a political party such as Hamas, or the holding of violent beliefs (as both extremist Palestinians and Israelis do) doesn’t make someone a combatant.
In the first 5 days of the brutal 22-day Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, 3 of the 4 Israelis who had been killed were classed as “civilians” in media sources; this was a proper classification even though it is likely that all three have served in the Israeli army.  In contrast, the reports on the Palestinian dead during the same period described only the women and children killed (9 women and 37 children) as civilians, letting readers assume that the rest of the dead were somehow engaged in combat.  While an accurate count of the dead is frequently hard to obtain in Gaza due to the continued assaults (the Palestine Red Crescent Society (www.palestinercs.org) , Palestine Center for Human Rights-Gaza (www.pchrgaza.org),  and B’Tselem (www.btselem.org) normally endeavor to keep count), from the targets and timing of many of the airstrikes it appears that most of the people killed were not combatants.  ).
Principle #3: Attacking civilians is prohibited.
Since “militant” lacks meaning, people are either civilians or combatants.  The most important principle of IHL is the prohibition on attacking civilians and civilian objects.  Only military objectives may be targeted.
A military objective is “limited to those objects which . . . make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” according to Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I 52(2).  Absent evidence that a standard civilian objective has been converted to military use, it must be presumed to be a civilian objective.
During Operation Cast Lead, Israel targeted numerous civilian objectives including homes, mosques, a fitness center, a university, a pharmacy, government buildings, and civilian police stations; already during Operation Defensive Edge, homes and a poultry farm have been among the targets. Despite Israel’s claims to the contrary, everything Hamas-related isn’t a legitimate target; while Hamas has a military wing, it is also responsible for all civic functions in the Gaza Strip.  (To illustrate: Hamas may attack an Israeli military base but can’t legitimately attack the Ministry of Education.)
Principle #4:  Even if the target is a military objective, Israel must weigh the expected civilian damage.
Parties shouldn’t launch “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,” according to Additional Protocol I (52)(5)(B) (emphasis mine).
Israel maintains it doesn’t target civilians but incidentally kills them because of their proximity to military targets.  Gaza, with a population of 1.5 million in an area of 140 square miles, is one of the most densely populated places on the planet.  This poses special considerations for any military attack.
As I write this, the loss of civilian life continues. The silence from the U.S. government has been deafening; we must demand that our country engage in a way that upholds IHL, or we risk encouraging further killing of civilians and breakdown of legal order.
People interested in learning more about IHL should visit the International Committee of the Red Cross’s helpful IHL explanation on their website (www.icrc.org), and B’Tselem’s website for information on IHL and Israel (www.btselem.org).

nderstanding ‘militant’ as a cover-up for civilian deaths, and other ways international law helps clarify the Israeli attack on Gaza
Abby Okrent